Consider using the simple moving average (MA) rule of Gartley (1935) to determine when to buy stocks, and when to sell them and switch to the risk-free rate. In comparison, how might the performance be affected if the frequency is changed to the use of MA calculations? The empirical results show that, on average, the lower is the frequency, the higher are average daily returns, even though the volatility is virtually unchanged when the frequency is lower. The volatility from the highest to the lowest frequency is about 30% lower as compared with the buy-and-hold strategy volatility, but the average returns approach the buy-and-hold returns when frequency is lower. The 30% reduction in volatility appears if we invest randomly half the time in stock markets and half in the riskfree rate.
Introduction
According to the standard investing separation theorem of Tobin (1958) , investors allocate investments between risk-free and risky assets. If the risk-free rate is low (high), the investors shift their wealth to (from) the risky assets. Fama (1972) divides forecasters into two categories, namely macro forecasters (or market timers) and micro forecasters (or security analysts), who try to forecast individual stock returns relative to the market returns. Merton (1981) defines a market timer to forecast when stocks will outperform (underperform) the risk-free asset, indicating that, when Merton (1981) shows theoretically that when investors have heterogeneous beliefs and imperfect information, the value of a random market timing forecast is zero, and if the forecast variable is distributed independently or the forecast is based on public information, its value is zero, too. In fact, Merton shows that the maximum value of skilled market timing is the value of the protective put against buy-and-hold strategy. Henriksson and Merton (1981) present an empirical procedure whereby correct forecasts can be analyzed statistically. However, if it is assumed that i t Black (1972) states that the slope of the security market line (SML) is flatter if there exists restrictions in borrowing, that is, leverage constraints in the model. Starting from Black et al. (1972) , many studies have reported that the security market line is too flat in US stocks compared with the SML suggested by the CAPM version of Sharpe and Lintner. Ang et al. (2009) , Baker et al. (2014) , and Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) find that lowbeta stocks outperform high-beta stocks statistically significantly. In fact, Frazzini and Pedersen report that significant excess profits in US stocks can be achieved by shorting high-beta stocks and buying low-beta stocks with leverage, but that leverage constraints make them dissappear. Using Black (1972) , investors often have leverage constraints, thereby making them place too much weight on risky stocks, which results in lower required return for high-beta stocks than would be justified by the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM. Markowitz (1952) defines portfolio risk simply as the volatility of porfolio returns. Clarke et al. (2010) find that the volatility of stock returns contains potentially an additional risk factor with respect to systematic risk that can be defined in the betas of CAPM by Sharpe and Lintner. Moreover, Ang et al. (2009) report that the total volatility of international stock market returns is highly correlated with US stock returns, thereby suggesting a common risk factor for US stocks. Baker et al. (2011) suggest that the low-volatility anomaly is due to investor irrational behaviour, mainly because an average fund manager seeks to beat the buy-and hold strategy by overinvesting in high-beta stocks. The explanations include preference for lotteries (Barberis and Huang 2008; Kumar 2009; Bali et al. 2011) , overconfidence (BenDavid et al. 2013) , and representativeness (Daniel and Titman 2006) ), which means that people assess the probability of a state of the world based on how typical of that state the evidence seems to be (Kahneman and Tversky 1974) . Baker and Wurgler (2015) argue that the anomality is also related to the limits of arbitrage. In fact, the extra costs of shorting prevents to take advantage of overpricing (Hong and Sraer 2016) . More importantly, Li et al. (2016) report that the excess returns of low-beta portfolios are due to mispricing in US stocks, indicating that the low-volatility anomaly does not exist because of systematic risk by some rational, stock specific volatility risk factor. They tested the low-volatility anomaly with monthly data from Market timing is closely related to technical trading rules. Brown and Jennings (1987) show theoretically that using past prices (like the MA rule in Gartley (1935) ) has value for investors, if equilibrium prices are not fully revealing, and signals from past prices have some forecasting qualities. More importantly, Zhu and Zhou (2009) indicate that the MA rules are particularly useful for asset allocation purposes among risk averse investors, when markets are forecastable (quality of signal). Moskowitz et al. (2012) argue that there are significant time series momentum (TSM) effects in financial markets that are not related to the cross-sectional momentum effect (Jegadeesh and Titman 1993) . However, TSM is closely related to MA rules, since it gives a buy (sell) signal according to some historical price reference points, whereas MA rules give a buy (sell) signal, when the current price moves above (below) the historical average of the chosen calculated rolling window measure.
Starting from LeRoy (1973) and Lucas (1978) Cochrane (2008) notes that the forecastability of excess returns may lead to successful market timing rules. Brock et al. (1992) test different MA lag rules for US stock markets, and find that they gain profits compared with holding cash. On the other hand, Sullivan et al. (1999) find that MA rules do not outperform the buy-and-hold strategy, if transaction costs are accounted for. Allen and Karjalainen (1999) use a genetic algorithm to develop the best ex-ante technical trading rule model using US data, and find some evidence of outperforming the buy-and-hold strategy. Lo et al. (2000) find that risk averse investors benefit from technical trading rules because they reduce volatility of the portfolio without giving up much returns when compared against the buy-and-hold strategy.
More recently, Neely et al. (2014) use monthly data from January 1951 to December 2011, and report that MA rules forecast the risk premia in US stock markets statistically significantly. Marshall et al. (2017) find that MA rules give an earlier signal than TSM, suggesting better returns for MA rules, but they both work best with large market value stocks. Moskowitz et al. (2012) use monthly data from January 1965 to December 2009, and report that TSM provides significant positive excess returns in futures markets. However, Kim et al. (2016) report that these positive excess returns produced by TSM are due to the volatility scaling factor used by Moskowitz et. al. (2012) .
Model Specifications
Consider an overlapping generation economy with a continuum of young and old 
Suppose that an investor j is a macro forecaster who allocates their initial wealth, The rolling window is 200 trading days. The first rule is to calculate MA in every trading day; the second frequency takes into account every 5th trading day (thereby providing a proxy for the weekly rule); the third frequency takes into account every 20th trading day (proxy for the monthly rule); the fourth rule is to calculate MA for every 40th trading day (proxy for every other month); the fifth rule takes into account every 60th trading day (proxy for every third month); the sixth rule takes into account every 80th trading day (proxy for every fourth month); and the seventh rule takes into account every 100th trading day (proxy for every fifth month). The trading rule for all cases is to use a simple crossover rule. When the trend-chasing MA turns lower (higher) than the current daily closing price, we invest the stock (threemonth US Treasury Bills) at the closing price of the next trading day. Thus, the trading rule provides a market timing strategy where we invest all wealth either in stocks (separately, every stock included in DJIA), or to the risk-free asset (three-month U.S.
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Treasury bill), where the moving average rule advices the timing.
At the first frequency (every trading day), we calculate daily returns for MA200, MA180, MA160, MA140, MA120, MA100, MA80, MA60, and MA40. For example, MA200 is calculated as: 
At the lowest frequency, where every 100th daily observation is counted, MAC2 is calculated as:
, we buy the stock at the closing price, t P , thereby giving daily returns as The data are dividend excluded, but the average annual dividend yield in DJIA stocks over the last thirty years has been +0.026, so that the biased buy and hold strategy produces +0.143 annually with equal weights among DJIA stocks before taxes. Thus, the random investment strategy produces +0.083 annually, with survivor bias.
Apppendix 1 (that is, the second column of Tables 1-7) Note that the model prohibits short selling since we have only long positions in stocks or investing in the risk-free rate. Then the limits of arbitrage argument of Baker et al. (2015) are consistent with our results.
Concluding Remarks
The analysis suggests that a macro forecaster can obtain higher returns with equal volatility (30 % below that of the buy-and-hold strategy) by reducing the frequency used in MA rules. The return to volatility ratio for risk-averse investors with MA market timing significantly outperforms the random benchmark strategy, when the frequency in the MA rules is reduced. This indicates that the forecasts are more accurate the longer is the time frame.
The results suggest that a flatter SML in the CAPM can be followed by the irrational preference of investors in high-beta stocks, as suggested by Baker et al. (2011) and Li et al. (2016) , since the empirically efficient frontier of portfolios becomes flatter than the theoretically efficient SML (random timing) (see Figure 1) . In other words, the empirical results suggests that market timing with the few past obervations (for example, every fourth month) in the past 200 rolling window daily prices, have produced significantly better returns to risk ratio for the portfolio of DJIA equally weighted stocks in the past 30 years than random timing. The finding points to the low-volatility anomaly.
One explanation for the results is that they are due to time-varying risk premiums. This is emphasized by Neely et al. (2014) , who claim that MA rules, in effect, forecast changes in the risk premium. If the results are rational products of time-varying risk premiums, the results suggest that investor sensitivity to risk must be extremely high, and their risk premium is larger (smaller) in downs (ups), as suggested by Campbell and Cochrane (1999) . As volatility rises (decreases), usually in downs (ups), the results suggest that when volatility is high, investors as a group tolerate significantly more risk (that is, volatility) than in calmer periods.
Consider the following numerical example: Assume that the risk premium is 0.08 in volatile downs, and 0.04 in calm ups, and the variance of returns is 0.03 in downs and 0.09 in ups. Then the risk aversion coefficient must be 0.89 in volatile down periods, and 1.33 in calm up periods. As market timing with MA rules works better in longer periods with few obervations, it seems to be more accurate in longer stochastic (up or down)
trends. 
